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RECENT DECISION
LAW-Commerce Clause-State Taxation of Aviation Fuel Used Exclusively in Foreign Commerce is Not Preempted by
the Federal Aviation Act and is Not Invalid Under the JapanLine Doctrine of the Foreign Commerce Clause. Wardair Canada,Inc. v. Florida Department of Revenue, 106 S. Ct. 2369 (1986).
CONSTITUTIONAL

I.

FACTS AND HOLDING

Appellant, Wardair Canada, Inc. (Wardair),1 brought a Florida state
action 2 for the refund of sales tax authorized by the state of Florida
against aviation fuel purchased within the state by foreign airlines.3 The
Florida Department of Revenue assessed a tax for the total amount of
the fuel purchased regardless of whether the airline used the fuel for
flight within or without the state and regardless of whether the airline
engaged in a significant or trivial amount of business within Florida.4
All Wardair flights were charter flights between the United States and
Canada; thus, Florida taxed fuel used exclusively in foreign commerce
by a foreign airline.5 Wardair alleged that the Florida statute violated
the dormant Foreign Commerce Clause of the Federal Constitution by
conflicting with an agreement regulating air charter service between the
United States and Canada.'

1. The appellant is a Canadian corporation operating charter flights to and from the
United States. Wardair Can., Inc. v. Florida Dep't of Revenue, 106 S. Ct. 2369, 2370

.(1986), afg, 455 So. 2d 326 (Fla. 1984).
2. Wardair filed suit in the Circuit Court for Leon County, Florida. 455 So. 2d 326,
327 (Fla. 1984).
3. FLA. STAT. § 212.08(4.)(a)(2) (1985).
4. Before April 1, 1983, the fuel tax was prorated on a mileage basis so that liability
existed only for the portion of the tax equal to the ratio of its Florida mileage to its total
mileage for the previous fiscal year. FLA. STAT. § 212.08(4) (1975). Beginning April 1,
1983, the Florida law was amended to repeal the proration aspect for airlines. FLA.
STAT. § 212.08(4)(2) (1985). The fuel tax was established at a rate of five percent on a
deemed price of $1.48 per gallon. Id. Effective July 1, 1985, Florida significantly

amended its fuel tax statute, FLA. STAT. § 212.08(6)(2) (Supp. 1987), and as a result,
the instant case relates only to Wardair's tax liability between April 1, 1983 and July 1,

1985. Wardair, 106 S. Ct. at 2371 n.2.
5. Wardair, 106 S. Ct. 2369.
6. Id. at 2371.
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Although the United States-Canadian agreement expressed a federal
policy to exempt foreign airlines from fuel taxes exclusive of contrary
state action, the Circuit Court of Leon County, Florida found that the
tax was not invalid under the dormant Foreign Commerce Clause. The
court concluded that federal policy precluded the states from regulating
foreign airlines in order to enable the United States to speak with one
voice when regulating commercial relations with foreign governments.8
The Florida Supreme Court reversed in part, holding that the United
States-Canadian agreement protected carriers only from national taxes
and, therefore, did not preempt the state from imposing the fuel tax.'
The Florida Supreme Court also noted that the agreement exempted
only national taxes and concluded that the United States and Canada
intentionally omitted the exemption of state taxes.10 After concluding
that the agreement did not exempt state taxes, the Florida Supreme
Court then found that the fuel tax did not interfere with the federal
government's attempt to speak with one voice and, therefore, was valid
under the Commerce Clause." On appeal, the United States Supreme
Court, affirmed. Held: The Federal Aviation Act does not preempt state
taxation of airline fuel used by foreign airlines exclusively in foreign
commerce, and the state taxation is not invalid under the dormant Foreign Commerce Clause. Wardair Canada, Inc. v. FloridaDepartment
of Revenue, 106 S. Ct. 2369 (1986).
II.

LEGAL BACKGROUND

In recent years, United States courts have given great attention to the
field of state taxation. Many state courts have written well-reasoned
opinions addressing state taxation issues.1 2 In addition, the United States
Supreme Court has decided a number of significant cases analyzing the
constitutional restraints on state taxation."3
Court decisions rather than congressional regulation have imposed
7.
8.
9.

Department of Revenue v. Wardair Can., Ltd., 455 So. 2d 326, 327 (Fla. 1984).
Id.
Id. at 329.
10. Id.
11. Id.
12. Hellerstein, State Income Taxation of MultijurisdictionalCorporations:Reflections on Mobil, Exxon, and H.R. 5076, 79 MiCH. L. REv. 113 (1980). See, e.g., R. L.
Quails v. Montgomery Ward & Co., 266 Ark. 207, 585 S.W.2d 18 (1979); Budget RentA-Car of Wash.-Or., Inc. v. Multnomah County, 287 Or. 93, 597 P.2d 1232 (1979).
13. See, e.g., Container Corp. of America v. Franchise Tax Bd., 463 U.S. 159
(1983); Japan Line, Ltd. v. County of Los Angeles, 441 U.S. 434 (1979); Complete Auto
Transit, Inc. v. Brady, 430 U.S. 274 (1977).
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most of the existing restrictions on state taxing power.14 In early state
taxation cases dealing with oceangoing vessels, the courts emphasized the
exclusive fiscal jurisdiction of the instrumentality's home port.1 5 The
"home port" doctrine permitted the taxation of interstate and foreign
commerce only by the jurisdiction of domicile of the instrumentality's
1

owner.

6

In 1979 the Supreme Court declined to apply the "home port" doctrine in JapanLine, Ltd. v. County of Los Angeles." In Japan Line the

Court labelled the "home port" doctrine anachronistic and further noted
that the doctrine "may indeed be said to have been 'abandoned'."'" Consequently, courts now avoid the home port doctrine and generally use the
apportionment formula. The doctrine of apportionment permits nondomiciliary jurisdictions to tax instrumentalities passing through their jurisdictions if the tax is fairly apportioned among all the jurisdictions affected.19 Theoretically, the formula avoids the possibility of multiple
taxation. The concept of apportionment grew from the belief that states
have a right to recover costs from those who benefit from the services of a
state.2 o
The Supreme Court began using apportionment with respect to inter-

14. Hellerstein, supra note 12, at 115. Congress passed its first legislation limiting
the state tax power in 1959. Id. at 113 n.3.
15. See, e.g., Southern Pac. Co. v. Kentucky, 222 U.S. 63 (1911); Ayer & Lord Co.
v. Kentucky, 202 U.S. 409 (1906); Morgan v. Parham, 83 U.S. (16 Wall.) 471 (1872);
St. Louis v. Ferry Co., 78 U.S. (11 Wall.) 423 (1870); Hays v. Pacific Mail S.S. Co., 58
U.S. (17 How.) 596 (1854).
16. Hays, 58 U.S. (17 How.) 596. The Court first applied the doctrine in Hays
when it stated that the federal government, holding exclusive jurisdiction over foreign
and interstate commerce, had the power to regulate ships entering the ports of other
states. In later decisions clarifying the rationale behind the doctrine, the Court stated that
the necessity for national uniformity provided the conceptual foundation for the doctrine.
Moreover, the "home port" doctrine protected the Commerce Clause concern of avoiding
unfair treatment of interstate and foreign commerce by preventing the multiple taxation
of interstate and foreign commerce. See, e.g., Southern Pac. Co., 222 U.S. 63; Ayer &
Lord Co., 202 U.S. 409.
17. Japan Line, Ltd. v. County of Los Angeles, 441 U.S. 434, 443 (1979).
18. Id. (quoting Northwest Airlines, Inc. v. Minnesota, 322 U.S. 292, 320 (1944)).

19. Recent Decision, State Taxation of Foreign-Owned Instrumentalities Used Exclusively in Foreign Commerce is Forbidden by the Commerce Clause When Multiple
Taxation or Impairment of Uniform Federal Regulation of Foreign Commerce Would
Result, 19 VA. J. INT'L L. 915, 920 (1979).
20. See, e.g., Postal Tel.-Cable Co. v. Richmond, 249 U.S. 252, 259 (1919). See also
Evansville-Vanderburgh Airport Auth. Dist. v. Delta Airlines, Inc., 405 U.S. 707, 719
(1972); Western Livestock v. Bureau of Revenue, 303 U.S. 250, 256-57 (1937).
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2 1 Years
state commerce on land in Pullman's Car Co. v. Pennsylvania.
later, after finding no substantive difference between barges and railroads, the Court extended the applicability of apportionment to inland
water channels.22 In BraniffAirways v. Nebraska Board23 the Supreme
Court again extended the apportionment doctrine to airplanes participating in interstate commerce. The Court concluded that airplanes exclusively using interstate routes more closely resembled inland barges than
apporoceangoing vessels.24 The Supreme Court had not yet applied2 the
5
vessels.
oceangoing
of
taxation
state
the
to
tionment doctrine
The original approach to state taxation of interstate and foreign commerce was restrictive. Later cases, however, suggest that states may tax
many activities, subject to particular constitutional requirements as set
forth by the Supreme Court in Complete Auto Transit, Inc. v. Brady26
and in Japan Line, Ltd. v. County of Los Angeles.27 In Complete Auto
Transit" the Supreme Court held that state taxation of interstate commerce is valid if the tax is "applied to an activity with a substantial
nexus with the taxing State, is fairly apportioned, does not discriminate
against interstate commerce, and is fairly related to the services provided
'29
by the State."
In 1979 the Supreme Court addressed the need for a constitutional

21. 141 U.S. 18 (1890). The Pullman Court found an apportioned tax on the rolling
stock of an interstate rail company not unconstitutional. The Court noted that maritime
commerce required forms of communication with other countries and 'was therefore
suited only for congressional regulation. The Court stated that interstate commerce by
land did not require this communication, thus distinguishing the two forms of commerce.
Id. at 23-24.
22. Ott v. Mississippi Valley Barge Line Co., 336 U.S. 169, 174-75 (1949).
23. 347 U.S. 590 (1954).
24. Id. at 599-600.
25. Apportionment cases regularly distinguished traffic on the oceans, arguably leaving the "home port" doctrine applicable in this area. See Japan Line, 441 U.S. at 44143.
26. 430 U.S. 274 (1977).
27. 441 U.S. at 434.
28. 430 U.S. 274.
29. Id. at 279. In Complete Auto, Mississippi levied a tax against a corporation on
the privilege of doing business in the state. The corporation, from another state, carried
goods manufactured outside the state to dealers in Mississippi. The measure of the tax
was the gross proceeds of the transportation charge. The taxable portion of the transportation began at a rail head in Mississippi and ended at a dealer within the state. In
addition to upholding the state tax, the Court overruled Spector Motor Service v.
O'Connor and Freeman v. Hewit which held that any tax applied to the privilege of
engaging in interstate commerce was per se unconstitutional under the Commerce
Clause. Id. at 288.
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standard concerning state taxation of foreign commerce under the Commerce Clause.30 In Japan Line the Court first applied the Complete
Auto test for interstate commerce to the foreign commerce situation and
then announced the need for a more thorough constitutional inquiry
when a state desires to tax foreign commerce.3 " The Supreme Court
added two tests to the Complete Auto Transit analysis when the tax in
question involved foreign commerce. Specifically, the Japan Line court
struck down the California property tax and stated that in addition to
the Complete Auto considerations, a state tax on foreign commerce first
must not create a significant risk of international tax multiplication, and
second must not prevent the federal government from speaking with one
voice when regulating commercial relations with foreign governments.3 2
In Japan Line the Court followed the concepts of avoiding multiple
taxation and achieving federal uniformity-concepts enunciated by
courts dealing with state attempts to tax instrumentalities of foreign
commerce.3 3 The Court had noted on numerous occasions that multiple
taxation not borne by local business can violate the Commerce Clause."
The need for the federal government to speak with one voice is a common concern expressed in the international relations field 5 and in
United States conventions and treaties.3 6 The Court found that the California tax prevented the United States from uniformly regulating commercial relations with foreign governments. The Court further determined that the United States-Japan Customs Conventions on Containers
"evidenced" the federal government's desire for uniform treatment of

30. Japan Line, 441 U.S. 434. The Court dealt with the narrow issue of whether
foreign owned instrumentalities of exclusively foreign commerce were subject to a state
property tax where the country of domicile had already levied a tax on the property. P.
J. HARTMAN, FEDERAL LIMITATIONS ON STATE AND LOCAL TAXATION § 2:17, at 95
(1981) [hereinafter HARTMAN].

31. Japan Line, 441 U.S. at 444-46.
32. Id. at 447-49. See also HARTMAN, supra note 30, § 2:17, at 94-101.
33. See generally Recent Decision, State Tax on Instrumentalities of Foreign Commerce Invalid When Tax Results in Multiple Taxation and Impairs FederalUniformity in Regulation of Foreign Trade, 12 VAND. J. TRANSNAT'L L. 999, 1002-04 (1979).
34. See, e.g., Evco v. Jones, 409 U.S. 91, 94 (1972); Central R.R. Co. v. Pennsylvania, 370 U.S. 607, 617-18 (1962); Ott, 336 U.S. at 174-75.
35. See, e.g., Henderson v. Mayor of New York, 92 U.S. 259, 273 (1875) (stating
that a regulation must be national in character if it affects a topic which concerns international relations); Board of Trustees of the Univ. of Ill. v. United States, 289 U.S. 48,
59 (1933).
36. See, e.g., Convention for the Avoidance of Double Taxation, Mar. 8, 1971,
United States-Japan, 23 U.S.T. 967, 1084-85, T.I.A.S. No. 7365.

VANDERBILT JOURNAL OF TRANSNATIONAL LAW

[Vol 20.365

cargo containers used solely in foreign commerce.3 7 The California tax,
the Court believed, would frustrate the national policy designed to remove the obstacles to instruments of foreign commerce. 8 The Court also
provided examples of other ways in which a state tax on instrumentalities of foreign commerce could prevent national uniformity in foreign
relations, such as international disputes or retaliation by foreign nations
in reaction to taxes they perceive as unfair.39
The Japan Line Court balanced the interest of domestic commerce
and the need for state revenue against the concern for unobstructed international trade. Considering these needs, the Court concluded that the
interests of international trade were of greater importance.40 Consequently, the Court found the Japan Line tax to be unconstitutional.
III.
A.

THE INSTANT OPINION

The Majority Opinion

In the instant opinion, the Supreme Court addressed the two issues of
preemption and the dormant Foreign Commerce Clause with regard to
the state taxation of foreign instrumentalities of commerce.
1. Preemption
The majority opinion, written by Justice Brennan, first considered
whether the Federal Aviation Act (the "Act") preempted the Florida
tax.41 Initially the Court commented that while the Act regulates aviation extensively, 4 2 state regulation in an area "is not preempted whenever there is any federal regulation of an activity or industry or area of
law."'43 As the majority in Wardairstated, the fundamental inquiry in a
preemption analysis is whether Congress intended to displace the state
law at issue. 4 The WardairCourt also stated that when a congressional
statute does not expressly preempt a state law, evidence of congressional
intent to preempt the state law is required.4
37. Japan Line, 441 U.S. at 452.
38. Id. at 452-53.
39. Id. at 450. See generally HARTMAN,supra note 30, at 98-99.
40. See HARTMAN,supra note 30, at 100.

41.

49 U.S.C. § 1301 et seq. (1982 & Supp. 11 1986).

42. Congress gave foreign air travel agencies power over such items as licensing,
routes, rates, tariffs and safety. Wardair, 106 S. Ct. at 2342.

43. Id.

44. Id.
45. Id. (citing Pacific Gas & Elec. Co. v. State Energy Resources Conservation and
Dev. Comm'n, 461 U.S. 190 (1983); Silkwood v. Kerr-McGee Corp., 464 U.S. 238
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In the instant case, the Supreme Court found no evidence that Congress intended to preclude state sales taxation of airplane fuel used in
foreign commerce. Rather, the Court found that the Act expressly allowed this type of taxation.4 6 The Court, examining section 1513 of the
Act, determined that Congress had addressed the issue of state taxation
of air commerce.' 7 The Court found that Congress had considered the
issue of state taxation of air commerce in the Act and had expressly
allowed the states to levy taxes in that area.' The Act, therefore, did not
preempt the state tax. The instant court, however, considered the possibility that Congress did not intend to include foreign commerce within
the scope of section 1513"1 and consequently refused to rely on that section of the Act to resolve the Commerce Clause issue. 50
2.

Dormant Foreign Commerce Clause

Wardair further argued that the Florida tax violated the Foreign
Commerce Clause of the Constitution because it presented an obstacle to
the goal of federal uniformity in foreign relations. The majority, however, rejected Wardair's dormant Foreign Commerce Clause argument.
When the federal government is silent, an analysis of the dormant Commerce Clause is necessary. In the instant case, the Supreme Court found
that Congress had indeed spoken, thus allowing Florida to tax the fuel
used in international aviation.
The majority's Commerce Clause analysis began with the Complete
Auto test 51 and the two additional Japan Line concerns relating to foreign commerce.52 The Court noted that these combined tests were dispositive of the Commerce Clause issue. 53 Wardair relied solely on the
(1984)).
46. Wardair, 106 S. Ct. at 2342.
47. Id. The Court's analysis found that section 1513(a) of the Act described the types
of taxes that states cannot impose upon commercial aviation. Section 1513(a) precludes
states from levying taxes directly or indirectly on passengers or on the sale of air transportation. 49 U.S.C. § 1513(a) (1982). Section 1513(b) allows the states to levy taxes in
all areas not covered by section 1513(a) and permits the states to levy sales or use taxes
on the sales of goods or services. 49 U.S.C. § 1513(b) (1982).
48. Among the permissible state taxes enunciated in § 1513(b) are "sales and use
taxes on the sale of goods or services." 49 U.S.C. § 1513(b) (1982); Wardair,106 S. Ct.
at 2372.
49. Chief Justice Burger criticizes the majority for taking this position. See infra
note 69 and accompanying text.
50. Wardair,106 S. Ct. at 2342.
51. See supra note 29 and accompanying text.
52. Wardair, 106 S. Ct. at 2373.
53. Id. Wardair conceded that the Florida tax satisfied the Complete Auto test.
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second Japan Line concern to form its case, arguing that the Florida
levy is invalid under the Foreign Commerce Clause because it frustrates
the ability of the federal government to speak with one voice when regulating commercial relations with foreign governments. The majority determined that the evidence presented did not reveal an explicit or implicit
federal policy of reciprocal tax exemptions for instrumentalities of foreign air traffic." Rather, through various conventions and international
agreements, the Court perceived the actions of the federal government as
at least acquiescing to the state's power to levy the type of tax at issue. 55
The majority examined the Chicago Convention on International Civil
Aviation and the bilateral agreements involving the United States and
other countries and concluded that the federal government's silence as to
whether states may levy taxes on aviation fuel used by foreign carriers in
international travel provided evidence indicating Congress intended no
preemption.58 While the majority found that these documents exhibit an
international aspiration to remove all obstacles to foreign air travel, including the taxation of fuel, they found that the law presently permits

Wardair also conceded that there is no risk of multiple international taxation as the tax
is levied only upon the sale of fuel, which can occur only within one jurisdiction. Id.
54. Id. at 2373-74. The evidence presented by Wardair included 1) the Chicago
Convention on International Civil Aviation, opened for signature Dec. 7, 1944, 61 Stat.
1180 [hereinafter the Chicago Convention] (an international convention of 157 countries
including the United States and Canada); 2) a resolution adopted on Nov. 14, 1966, by
the International Civil Aviation Organization (ICAO) [hereinafter the Resolution]; and
3) over 70 bilateral agreements dealing with international aviation to which the United
States is a party. Id.
55. Id. at 2374. The majority did note, however, that it perceived an "international
aspiration" to remove all obstacles to foreign air commerce. Id.
56. The Court concluded that the Chicago Convention forbids local taxes on fuel
only when the fuel is aboard the airplane on arrival and kept on board after departure.
The Chicago Convention does not forbid taxation of fuel purchased in that country. Id.
The Court continued by examining the Resolution and noting that although the document expressly supports an international plan to exempt fuel from all taxes, the Resolu-

tion is merely the product of an organization to which the United States belongs. The
federal government has not acted to give the Resolution the force of law. The Court
concluded that the Resolution merely represents the policy of an organization to which
the United States is one of many members, not the policy of the United States. Id. Next,
the Court examined the 70 bilateral aviation agreements. Taxation by political subdivisions, the Court noted, is not mentioned in any of the agreements. The Court viewed this
omission as a policy choice by the parties to the agreements to allow this form of taxation. That some states and Canadian provinces have levied taxes on aviation fuel used by
American and Canadian carriers the Court viewed by as suggesting that the parties to
the United States-Canadian Agreement understood it to allow the tax. Id. at 2375.
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the taxation of this fuel by the states. 57 The Court, therefore, concluded
that Congress had affirmatively acted and Congress' actions did not prohibit the tax in question.5" The majority reached this conclusion by a
"negative implication arising out of more than 70 agreements entered
into since the Chicago Convention. ' 59 According to the Court, the "negative implication" displayed a federal policy permitting the type of tax at
issue."' After concluding that the federal government has affirmatively
acted to permit state taxation of fuel exclusively used in foreign commerce, the Court refused to apply a dormant Commerce Clause analysis. 1 The Court stated that "[i]t would turn dormant Commerce Clause
analysis entirely upside down to apply it . . .in such a way as to reverse the policy that the Federal Government has elected to follow."86 2
The majority explained that in both its interstate and international
workings the dormant Commerce Clause only operates in situations
where the federal government has remained silent.8 3 When the government is silent, the dormant Commerce Clause ensures that "the essential
attributes of nationhood will not be jeopardized by States acting as independent economic actors."' " However, as the Court found in the instant
case, Congress may act to allow states certain regulatory authority. 5
Congressional grants of regulatory authority answer the dormant Foreign Commerce Clause inquiry for the courts. 8 Consequently, the Court
concluded that in the instant case a dormant Commerce Clause analysis
is unnecessary as Congress had considered the question of whether Florida may impose this type of tax and had answered the question in the
affirmative. 7
B.

Dissenting Opinions

Chief Justice Burger wrote a separate opinion concurring in part and
concurring in the judgment. While Justice Brennan's majority opinion
57. Id. at 2374.
58. Id.
59. Id. at 2375. The Court noted that it did not consider whether in the absence of
the international agreements examined, the Foreign Commerce Clause would invalidate
the Florida tax. Id.
60. Id.
61. Id.
62. Id.
63. Id.

64. Id.

65. Id.
66. Id.
67. Id.
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found a Commerce Clause analysis necessary, Chief Justice Burger
found it unnecessary in light of legislative history of the Act.,, Within
the legislative history of section 1513, Justice Burger found it relevant
that there existed no indication of an intent to limit section 1513(b) to
interstate commerce.6 9 In addition, Chief Justice Burger examined section 1513 and concluded that the plain language of the section expressly
permits the Florida tax at issue. 70 Consequently, the Chief Justice stated
that there was no need to examine the tax further. 1 Chief Justice Burger commented that the majority, in refusing to decide the case on the
to respect the choice made by
express language in section 1513, failed
72
taxation.
state
of
area
this
in
Congress
Justice Blackmun wrote a dissenting opinion expressing the view that
the instant case is indistinguishable from Japan Line and that the Court
should decide the case solely on Commerce Clause grounds.73 The Justice believed that both the instant tax and the Japan Line tax prevented
the federal government from speaking with one voice and, therefore,
were unconstitutional.74 Justice Blackmun disagreed with the majority's
conclusion that the evidence did not exhibit the type of "governmental
silence . . .that triggers dormant Commerce Clause analysis."'7 The

68. Id. at 2376.
69. Id. at 2377. Justice Burger pointed to pieces of legislative history to support his
view of the language of section 1513. First, the State Department and the Senate Legislative Counsel advised Congress that, as it was used in the bill, air commerce included
foreign air commerce. Id. See 49 U.S.C. § 1301(4) (1982); Hearings on S.2397 et al.

Before the Subcomm. on Aviation of the Senate Comm. on Commerce, 92nd Cong., 2d
Sess. 129, 136 (1972) [hereinafter Senate Hearings] (letter of David M. Abshire, Department of State); Senate Hearings, supra, at 207 (Memorandum of Peter W. LeRoux,
Senior Counsel, Office of Legislative Counsel).
70. Wardair, 106 S.Ct. at 2378. The Chief Justice noted that "air transportation"
and "air commerce" are defined in the Act to include foreign commerce and transportation. Id. at 2377-78. See 49 U.S.C. § 1301(4), (10) (1982).
71. Wardair, 106 S.Ct. at 2378 (citing Aloha Airlines, Inc. v. Director of Taxation
of Haw., 464 U.S. 7 (1983)). Chief Justice Burger relied on this quote from Aloha to
support his conclusion:
[W]hen a federal statute unambiguously forbids the States to impose a particular
kind of tax on an industry affecting interstate commerce, courts need not look
beyond the plain language of the federal statute to determine whether a state statute that imposes such a tax is pre-empted.
Aloha Airlines, 464 U.S. at 12 (footnote omitted), quoted in Wardair, 106 S.Ct. at
2376 (Burger, C.J., concurring).
72. Wardair, 106 S.Ct. at 2378.
73. Id. at 2378.
74. Id.
75. Id.
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dissent further noted that the Court has never used a "negative implication" to validate a state burden on foreign commerce. 6 Justice Blackmun
commented that in order to remove a state regulation from Commerce
Clause scrutiny, the federal government's intent "must be unmistakably
clear."7 The dissenting Justice disregarded the "negative implication
arising out of more than 70 agreements" relied on by the majority and
considered that what is relevant is "the Federal Government has not
'78
provided the affirmative approval required to permit States to act."
The majority opinion conceded that the international agreements,
upon which the Court relied in order to avoid a dormant Commerce
Clause analysis, displayed an international "aspiration" to avoid obstacles to foreign air travel-including fuel taxation. Justice Blackmun, in
his dissent, commented upon this concession by the majority and
strengthened his argument by stating that this concession "is precisely
the federal policy that renders the application of Florida's tax to the fuel
here unconstitutional.""
Justice Blackman continued with an analysis of the international
agreements in evidence. The Justice concluded that the agreements reveal a federal policy "directed at the creation of reciprocal tax exemptions in the area of foreign aviation."'8' The dissent noted the probable
consequences of the Wardairmajority's opinion: 1) the decision will hinder United States efforts to obtain reciprocal tax immunity with foreign
governments; 2) foreign governments and their political subdivisions may
impose retaliatory taxes; 3) because the nation is not speaking with one

76. Id.
77. Id. (quoting South-Central Timber Development, Inc. v. Wunnieke, 467 U.S.
82, 91 (1984).
78. Wardair, 106 S. Ct. at 2379.
79. Id. See supra note 55 and accompanying text.
80. Wardair, 106 S. Ct. at 2379. See also HARTMAN, supra note 30, at § 2:17
(1987 Supp.).
81. Wardair, 106 S. Ct. at 2379. Justice Blackmun stated:
Although these provisions stop short of explicitly banning state levies on aircraft
fuel used in foreign travel, the indisputable pattern that emerges is one of a policy
of reciprocal tax exemptions for instrumentalities of international commerce, like
the containers in JapanLine and the fuel at issue here. The Government's inability to date to achieve full international consent to reciprocal tax exclusions neither
negates nor demonstrates the absence of a federal policy; it simply means that the
United States has not fully succeeded, as yet, in transforming its policy into law.
Indeed, the "aspiration . . . to eliminate all impediments to foreign air travel"
. . . recognized by the Court, . . . is precisely the federal policy that renders the
application of Florida's tax to the fuel here constitutional.
Id. (Blackmun, J., dissenting).
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voice, the United States position in negotiations designed to achieve the
federal policy of reciprocity will suffer; and 4) other states would have
the ability to impose similar taxes on goods and services. 2 Justice Blackmun closed by stating that because the majority's opinion allows Florida
through its unilateral act to obstruct United States foreign relations and
trade, the fuel tax is unconstitutional under the Commerce Clause according to the Court's Japan Line decision."3
IV.

COMMENT

The Reagan administration, during the 1980s, has introduced and
supported a plan of new federalism. One consequence of this new federalism is that states have received fewer federal funds to support programs formerly administered by the federal government. As the federal
government continues to reduce the amount of federal aid to the states,
the states will have to resort to other means in order to meet their fiscal
needs. States most likely will impose new taxes and increase other
taxes." Consequently, as the states need more revenues and become
more creative, the Supreme Court will hear more cases, such as
Wardair,dealing with the federal limitations on state and local taxation.
In drafting new state taxes, state legislators will look to cases such as
Wardair for guidance to keep the tax within constitutional boundaries.
The Supreme Court, in cases preceding Wardair, consistently required that the federal government's intent to permit state action "be
unmistakably clear" in order to remove a state regulation from the reach
of the dormant Commerce Clause.8 5 Moreover, the Court has stated that
in cases where foreign policy concerns exist, the need for the federal government's "affirmative approval" is increased."' However, in Wardair,a
case with many foreign policy concerns, the Court appears to have taken
a new approach to dormant Commerce Clause analysis through its use
8
of a "negative implication" to discern the federal government's intent. 7
According to the instant opinion, a state can now act in an area if the
federal government's approval can be "negatively implied," rather than
"be unmistakably clear."

82. Id. at 2379.
83. Id.
84. See HARTMAN, supra note 30, at § 2:17 (1987 Supp.).
85. 106 S. Ct. at 2378 (quoting South-Central, 467 U.S. at 91).
86. Wardair, 106 S. Ct. at 2378 (quoting South-Central, 467 U.S. at 92). The
heightened need in these situations arises from the fact that the United States foreign
policy is the exclusive responsibility of the federal government. Id.
87. See supra notes 59-67 and accompanying text.
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The instant Court's "negative implication" standard in comparison to
the "unmistakably clear" standard appears, in this case, to provide states
with an easier burden in proving that Congress permits state regulation
in an area. 8 In future cases, however, application of the "negative implication" test may find that legislative history or international agreements
negatively imply that Congress does not permit a state to act in an area.
Consequently, the "negative implication" standard may create additional
uncertainty for litigants attempting to interpret federal agreements in
dormant Commerce Clause related cases. The Wardair Court's new
standard seems to allow the Court greater leeway in interpreting federal
documents and actions than the "affirmative approval" standard used in
earlier cases.
The Wardair decision, allowing Florida to tax this type of foreign
commerce, seems sensitive to the state's increased revenue needs. The
Court chose to subordinate the federal goal of removing obstacles to international air traffic, by treating the goal as just an aspiration. This
result may lead to other states passing similar taxes or even bolder levies
on foreign commerce, hoping that, once again, local interests will overcome national interests. The Wardair decision, or the additional state
levies in response to it, may also trigger responses from foreign nationals
allowing their countries and states to levy additional obstacles to air traffic. The final result of the Wardair decision may achieve additional revenue for the states, but only while hindering international air traffic to a
greater extent.
Barbara Keelty Caldwell

88.

Wardair, 106 S. Ct. at 2378-79.

